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That depends. Standard economic wisdom is this: cuts in the
minimum wage increase employment in the formal sector, thus
reducing the effective supply of labor to the informal sector and
increasing the income of workers in the informal sector. But in
a more complex model, cuts in minimum wages do not always
improve standards of living in the informal sector.
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The paper analyzes the effect a change in the  affects informal sector earnings both through
minimum wage has on the eamings of workers in  changes in labor productivity and changes in
the informal sector who are supposedly not  relative prices. Once these two factors are
covered by minimum wage legislation. The  considered, a minimum wage cut could result in
standard view is that reducing the minimum  reducing informal sector wages, even if formal
wage, which increases employment ia the formal  sector employment increases.
sector, reduces the effective supply of labor to
the informal sector, increasing the wage in the  If workers in the formal sector are the main
informal sector.  buyers of the goods produced in the informal
sector, and their income elasticity of demand is
But Fiszbein argues that the effect of the  relatively large, workers in the informal sector
minimum wage on earnings in the informal  could be hurt by a cut in the minimum wage.
sector does not depend exclusively on its effect  They could similarly be hurt if the informal
on labor mobility between the formal and  sector employs a large part of the urban labor
informal sector. Demand for goods also links the  force, and if demand for the goods produced in
two sectors - and this demand is seldom  the informal sector is price-inelastic.
factored into theoretical discussions.
Fiszbein's model, however, does not affect
Based on a general equilibrium approach,  the case for cuts in minimum wages on the
Fiszbein builds a dual economy model in which  grounds of efficiency. Reducing the minimum
the two sectors are linked not only through the  wage does increase jobs and output in the formal
labor market but also through the goods market.  sector.
In this framework, reducing the minimum wage
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In this essay I will analyze the effect of a change in
the minimum wage on the earnings of workers in the informal
sector,  who  supposedly  are  not  covered  by  minimum  wage
legislation.  The  standard  view  of  the  matter  is  that  a
reduction of the minimum wage, which increases employment in
the formal sector, reduces the effective supply of labor to
the informal sector increasing the wage at which the latter
cl.ears.
Strong  policy  conclusions  can  be  - and  have  been  -
derived from the standard view. Given that workers  in the
informal sector earn less than those in the formal sector, a
reduction in  the minimum wage should reduce income inequality
between workers in the two sectors. Also, to the extent that
most of the urban poor work in the informal sector, reducing
the minimum wage could be an effective anti-poverty policy.
The  possibility  of  a  positive  correlation  between
minimum  wages  and  informal  sector  earnings  has  been
1previously  discussed  in  the literature.  Mincsr  [1976]  showed
that,  when  the  possibility  of some  workers  queuing  for  formal
sector jobs is considered,  the direction  of the effect  of
changes in the minimum wages on informal sector earnings
cannot  be determined  a priori.  In this essay,  I explore  the
possibility  of a non-standard  result following  a different
avenue. In Mincer's approach, a  non-standard  result is
associated  with a large  reduction  in unemployment.  Here, I
will discuss  the role  of demand-factors,  rather  than  jupply
factors,  in generating  a non-standard  result.  This view of
the matter, I suggest, is more likely to provide a more
general explanation  of some patterns observed  among Latin
American  countries.
The essay  will  be-organized  as follows.  Section  I  will
review the literature  on the impact of minimum wages on
inequality. Section 2  will  discuss the  role  of  labor
realloc  .. on  and  demand  factors  in  determininq  the
relationship between minimum wages  and  informal sector
earnings. In  section 3  the  model  will  be  developed.
Conclusions  will  be discussed  in section  4.
21.  MINIMUM WAGES AND  INCOME  INEQUALITY.
Minimum  wage  policies  are  controversial  among  economists
and policy makers both in developed and less developed
countries.  Critics  and  supporters  have  debated  the
effectivenesq  and desirability  ot such  policies  with little
agreement.
Minimum  wage laws  are  viewed  as playing  diverse  roles.
Supporters  usually justify  minimum  wages as a distributive
tool, that is, as an adequate  way of improving  the living
conditions  of the poor,  the unskilled,  and  the un-organized
workers (Starr [1981]). In many LDCs minimum wages  are
expected, in addition, to provide an acceptable  minimum
standard of  living for  all  workers  (Watanabe [1976]).'
Critics,  on the other  hand,  emphasize  the efficiency  losses
associated  with  their  use,  and  disqualify  them  as  an  adequate
way of affecting  inequality.
Economic theory, however, has  not  been  extremely
successful  iii  determining  the  distributive  effects  of  minimum
wages.  The ambiguity  of the conclusions  derived from most
theoretical  analyses  arises  from  the  fact  that  minimum  wages
affect  income  inequality  in  a  variety  of  ways.  The  impact  on
'In  Mexico,  for  example,  the  federal  constitution  states
that "The  minimum  wage to be received  by a worker  shall  be
that  which  is  considered sufficient, according to  the
conditions  of each  region,  to  satisfy  the  normal  needs  of  his
living,  education  and honest  pleasures,  considering  him as
head  of a family" (cited  by Starr  (1981],  p.3).
3thoza  workers directly  affected by changes in the minimum
wage  might  be overshadowed  by a number  of indirect  effects. 2
A variation  in the minimum  wage can induce  changes in
the  wages  of workers  earning  more than  the  minimum  wage 3, as
well  as  the  earnings  of  those  not  covered  by the  legislation.
It could also lead to changes in the aggregate  level and
skill composition  of employment  by those firms  or sectors
that  are  covered  and abide  by the legislation.  As a result,
changes in  open unemployment and  reallocation  of  labor
between the covered and uncovered sectors could result.
Furthermore,  the size of the labor force itself  might be
affected  in those  circumstances.  As a result,  analyzing  the
distributive  impact  of minimum  wages  implies  quantifying  all
these effects, a  task that requires the use  of complex
general  equilibrium  models. 4
2See for example U.S. Minimum Wage Study Commission
(1981]  (volume  1).
3As long as there is the possibility  of substituting
workers  with different  levels  of skills,  an increase  in the
minimum wage could induce an increase in the demand for
relatively  skilled  workers, inducing  an increase  in their
wages.  Also, the existence  of some type  of wage-comparison
mechanism linking tae wages  of  different categories of
workers  could  result  in  spill-over  effects  (Grossman  [1983]).
4A  few  of  such  models  have  been  built  for  the  case  of  the
United States. See for example Cox-Oaxaca (1981, 1984],
Johnson-Browning  (1983]  and Wolf-Nadiri  (1981].  A study  for
Philippines  can be found  in Rodgers  et al [19783.
4Minimum  wages  have  recurrently  been  discussed  within  the
development  literature. 5 The proportion  cf workers  that are
ia  principle affected  by  minimum  wages  is  larger  in
developing  than in developed  countries. 6 Thus,  the potential
beneficial  and detrimental  effects  appear  to be of a larger
magnitude  among developing  countries.  Mainstream  development
economists  have  generally  argued  that  minimum  wages  are one
of the principal  sources (the  other  being labor  unions)  of
labor  market  segmentation,  unemployment,  underemployment  and
other  labor  market  distortions typically  observed  in
developing  countries.
Starting  with Todaro (1969],  minimum wages have been
seen as generating  continuous  rural-urban  migration  in the
presence  of high  open  unemployment  rates.  Minimum  wages  have
also been  singled ou.;  as one  of the  important factors
explaining  the development  of the urban informal  sector.  A
minimum  wage  above  the  level  that  would  equilibrate  the  labor
market  reduces employment  in the formal  sector, increasing
5Minimum  wages  received  prominent  attention  in  Berry  and
Sabot's  (1978]  and Squire's  (1981]  surveys  of labor  markets
in  LDCs.
6In many Latin American countries,  approximately  one
fourth of the urban labor force earns no more than the
minimum  wage.  For example,  the  estimates  for Chile  are 25*,
and for Costa Rica, Brazil, and Mexico 30%  (see  Solimano
[1988],  Pollack (1989],  Maia-Saldanha  (1989]  and Villareal-
Breach  (1988]).
Sthe effective  supply  of labor .n  the informal  sector. 7 As a
result,  the informal  segment  of the labor  market  clears  at a
wage  below  the  level  that  would  prevail  in  the  absence  of the
minimum  wage.
This  has  negative  consequences both  in  terms  of
efficiency  and  equity. 8 In  the  first  place,  the  allocation  of
labor  is  not optimal  as the  marginal  product  of labor  is  not
equalized  between  sectors  (Harbergar  (1971]).  This  efficiency
loss  is  magnified  thr-;ugh  time  as  capital  intensive
technologies are  over-adopted  in  view of  the  distorted
relative  prices.  In the second  place,  only  an elite ("labor
aristocracy") is able  to get  the protected  jobs,  while  the
rest of the workers are pushed into low-paying  jobs. If
selection !or  formal sector  jobs is not done on a random
basis  but  on  the  basis  of  credentials,  personal  contacts,  and
race, minimum wages  constitute an  important source of
economic  injustice.
The view arising from such analyses is that minimum
wages  are too costly  for  developing  countries,  and probably
unfair  to the extent  that they favor  a small  elite at the
?The  formal sector is identified  as those firms that
abide  by the  minimum  wage legislation.  Throughout  this  essay
the  terms  formal,  covered  and  protected  (informal,  uncovered
and  unprotected)  will  be  used  as  synonyms
%inimum wages  have also  been  blamed  for the existence
of poor inter-sectoral  labor  mobility (Fallon  and Riveros
E1989]).  Th6  growing  literature  on structural  adjustment  has
pointed out rigid minimum  wages in  the  tradable sector as a
cause  for  the  failure  of  reform  attempts  (Edwards  and  Edwards
(1990]).
6expense  of the  masses  of underprivileged.  The obvious  policy
conclusion  is that minimum wages should be eliminated  or
reduced.  A reduction (or elimination)  of the minimum waae
should.  accordina  to this view. increase  emplo3Ment  in the
formal  sector.  reduce  the effective  sumply  of labor  to the
the latter  clears.  Thus.  a golicy  of minimum  wage rduction
can be lustified  not only on efficiency  but also on eauity
grounds  because  it improves  the economic  conditions  of the
Roorn".  This  policy  conclusion  contrasts  with  the
suggestions,  made by some multilateral  organizations,  that
the earnings  of the urban poor (most  of whom work in the
informal sector) are  linked in a  positive way  to  the
evolution  of real  minimum  wages.9
The importance  of this debate  transcends  the academic
community.  During  the  last  decade,  many  developing  countries
have reversed aggressive minimum wage policies followed
throughout  the  1950's,  60's  and  part  of the  70's.  This trend
is  notorious  among  Latin  American  countries.  Among  the  eleven
countries  reported  in table  1, eight  experienced  reductions
in the  real  minimum  wage of an order  of magnitude  of 20%  to
70*  since  1980.  The  reduction  in  minimum wages  was
accompanied  by  an increase  in  wage  dispersion.  In  all  but  one
9For example, the  International  Labour Organization
argues  that  "the  earnings  from  informal  activities  are  liable
to follow  the  tendency  of the  minimum  wage  and  the increased
level  of  output  per informal  worker  induced  by the expansion
of expenditure  of the modern  sector"  [PREALC  1987,  p.86].
7case (Costa  Rica, a country  in which  the real minimum  wage
increased),  the  minimum wage  fell relative to  average
wanufacturing  wages.
Table  1:  Minimum  Waaes  in
Latin  America  in 1989 (1980-100)
Real MW  MW/W
Argentina  77.1  87
Brazil  70.6  67
Chile  79.7  77
Colombia  110.7  93
Costa  Rica  116.5  133 (*)
Ecuador  42.3  na
Mexico  50.7  74 (*)
Paraguay  140.6  na
Peru  26.;  72
Uruguay  78.6  79
Venezuela  68.6  na
Source:  CEPAL  C1989a].  NW  a  Ninfmn  Wabg,  W u Was*  fn  iufacturing,  C)  I986.
Some  multilateral organizations have  voiced  their
concern  on the negative  consequances  such policies  have on
poverty.  The International  Labour  Organization,  for  example,
in  its  1987  report  said  that  "unfortunately,  in  a limited  but
increasing  number of developing  countries  caution in the
adjustment  of minimum  wages  had led  to substantial  declines
in their  real value  so that  they  have lost  all relevance  in
8iage  determination.  Thus, the modest but still  significa.t
relevant  contribution  that minimum  wage fixing  may make to
poverty  alleviation  throughout  the  raising  of  excessively  low
wages  has been lost". 10
In the case  of Latin  America,  the International  Labour
Organization  (PREALC  (1987])  and  the  Economic  Commission  for
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  (CEPAL  (1988])  have  ;ndicated
the need for wage regulations  (including  minimum  wages) In
order  'o  ensure  a  reduction  in inequality  and  an improvement
in the standards  of living  of urban  workers.
Poverty,  in  fact,  has  incieased  in  the  region  during  the
1980's.  According  to Rosenthal [1990]  the number  of Latin
Americans  in poverty  increased  by thirty  million  throughout
the decade, so that the percentage of people in poverty
increased  from 36% to 38% since 1980.  Similarly,  in urban
areas  poverty  Increased  from  21%  to 29%  in  the  first  half  of
the decade 1". Table  2 shows the changes  in povfcty in nine
of  the  eleven countries covered in  table 1  for  which
information  is available.  The percentage  of the population
under  the poverty  line increased  in all seven  countries  in
which the real minimum  wage fell. Only Colombia  and Costa
Rica experienced  reductions  in poverty.
'OILO  [1987],  vol.3,  p.102.
"See Lustig  [1990].
9Evidence on informal sector  earnings is  scarce.  However,
the available information appears to indicate that average
earnings in the informal sector changed in  the same direction
as  real minimum wages. Vivancos [1989),  for example, found a
Table 2: Poverty in Latin America
(Percentage  population under poverty line)12
1980/81  1986/87
Argentina  8.0  13.0
Brazil  17.7  23.3
Chile  14.4  19.2 (c)
Colombia  43.0  38.0
Costa  Rica  29.0  (a)  24.0
Ecuador  53.0  55.0
Mexico  48.5  59.0 (d)
Peru  49.0  52.0
Venezuela  12.0 (b)  17.0
(a)  1977,  (b)  1982,  Cc) 1985,  (d)  1988
12The definitions used are different for each country.
Thus, the numbers are not comparable across countries. The
information for Argentina, Colombia and Pert were obtained
from  CEPAL  (1985] and  CEPAL  (1989bJ; for Costa  Rica  and
Venezuela  from World Bank  [l190]; for Brazil from Fox and
Morley (1990]; for Chile from Pollack and Uthoff (19893  for
Ecuador  from  Santos  (1989];  and  for  Mexico  from  Lustig
(1990].
10reduction  in average informal  earnings  in  Venezuala.  Lopez
and Riveros (1989]  found that during  the 1980's,  wages of
informal  workers fell in Argentina,  Chile  and Uruguay;  and
increased inColombia. Their  evidence  for  Colombia  is
confirmed  by Reyes  [1987]  who found that informal  wages
increased  with the  minimum  wages  since  the  mid 1970's.
Tha  nature  of  the  empirical  evidence  just  reviewed,  does
not establish  the existence  of a statistical  relationship
between  minimum  wages and  wages  in the informal  sector.  The
1980's  have  been  a  period  of  macroeconomic  instability  in  all
Latin American countries,  during  which labor  markets were
affected  in a variety of ways. 13 More complete  data  would
be  needed  in  order  to  distinguish the  effects  of
macroeconomic  factors  on  informal  sector  earnings,  from  those
generated  by  wage  policies.
Nevertheless,  the recent  experience  of Latin  American
countries  with  policies  of  minimum  wage  reductions,  suggests
that  the  nature  of  the  correlation  between  minimum  wages  znd
informal  sector  earnings  is  a  matter  that  deserves  more
attention.  The two opposite  views  of  minimum  wages  that  have
been  discussed,  arise  from  different  methodological
approaches  to the  problem.  The first  approach  looks  into  the
effects  of minimum  wages  on  the  allocation  of labor  within  a
framework  in  which  the  formal  and  informal  sectors  are  linked
exclusively  through  the  supply  of labor.  As a result, it
3See  for example  Riveros  (1990].
11emphasizes  the  competitive  nature  of  the  relationship  between
formal  and  informal  seccor  workers.  The  second  approach  takes
into  account  the existence  of demand  links  between  the two
sectors  through the goods market, and thus emphasizes  the
existence  of common interests  between workers in the two
sectors.
In the real world,  the formal  and informal  sectors  are
linked  both through  the supply  of labor  and the demand  for
goods.  Thus,  one should  expect  to find  both  competition  and
common interests  between  the  fo-mal  and  informal  workers.  In
thiu  essay,  I  will  incorporate  the  existence  of  demand  links
in  an  otherwise  standard  model  of  a  segmented  economy  in
order to establish the  conditions  under  which  one  should
expect  the conclusions  of each  approach  to be valid.
122.  TM  XINI)WM  WAGE AND  TRE WXGE IN  TRE  INPORMAL SECTOR
The political appeal of recommendations to reduce  (or
eliminate) minimum wages depends crucially on the wage in the
informal sector  increasing as a result of the reduction in
the minimum wage. The main question to be addressed is thus,
what ghanae should  we expect in  the earnings of those  wrQking
in the informal sector when the minimum wage is reduced?
A. The role of labor reallocation effects.
Answering this question analytically  requires a  model of
a  segmented labor market. The  standard approach has been to
look at  the  employment  effects of changes  in the minimum
wage. Such approach indicates that informal sector earnings
will increase as a result of a reduction in the minimum wage
as lone as the effective labor suDDly to the sector falls.
When  the  minimum wage  is enforced partially  (in the
formal  sector), the supply of labor is fixed,  and there is no
unemployment, the relationship between the minimum wage and
informal  sector earnings  is  necessarily  negative.  A reduction
(or  elimination)  of  the  minimum  wage  should  increase
employment in the formal sector, reduce the effective supply
of labor to the informal sector and, as a result, increase
the wage at which the latter clears. The elasticity of labor
13demand in both sectors will determine the magnituda but not
the direction of the change in the informal sector wage.
Relaxing the assumption of a fixed labor  supply does not
affect the qualitative results (see  Welsh  1974])  .14  However,
an  Mincer  [1976]  showed,  relaxing  the  assumption  of  no
unemployment  affects  the  standard conclusion. In Mincer's
model, the existence of a non-competitive  wage in one sector
induces  some  workers  to  queue  for  formal  jobs.  The
equilibrium unemployment rate is obtained from the condition
that the not discounted gain from queuing for formal sector
jobs equals zero.
A reduction in the minimum waqg - the  wage in  the formal
sector  - will  result  in  an  increase  in  formal  sector
employment (the  magnitude of which depends on the elasticity
of  labor  demand).  The  number  of  unemployed  workers,  in
equilibrium, will also fall as a -esult of the reduction in
the minimum wage. Depending on how large such a reduction is
(compared  with the increase in formal sector employment) the
size of the informal  sector can increase or decrease.  The
direction of the change in informal sector wages depends on
the  direction  of  the  labor reallocation generated  by  the
reduction  in  the  minimum  wage.  If  the  reduction  in
14Welsh  established  his  results  assuming  the  wage-
elasticities  of  labor  demand  were  the  same  in  the  two
sectors. However, the qualitative  results remain the same in
the more general case in which the elasticities differ, as
long as they have the correct sign.
14unemployment  is  larae  enouah.  the  wage in  the  informal  sector
falls.  Is
Mincer  provides  a  potential  rationale  for  the  existence
of  a  positive  relationship  between  minimum  wages  and  informal
sector  earnings.1 6 However,  such  a  result  is  always
associated  with a reduction in the number of unemployed
larger  than  the increase  in formal  jobs.
The former,  however,  does  not  appear  to  be a reasonable
outcome  in  the  real  world.  Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of
Mexico.  In 1980  the  rate  of  urban  open  unemployment  was 4.5%.
If in that year the wage  in  the formal sector had been
reduced  by  o0%,  even  if the  wage-elasticity  of labor  demand
in  the  sector  were  as low  as 0.3,  the  unemployment  rate  would
still  have to be cut in  half for the non-standard  result  to
occur. If the wage-elasticity  was  0.5, the non-standard
result  would require  that the unemployment  rate fall below
0.88%.17  This simple  calculation,  which could be repeated
Issee  appendix  1 for a  mathematical  presentation  of the
model.
"An  important  question  is  whether  considering
heterogenous labor affects Mincer's results. Abowd  and
Killingsworth  (1981]  have extended  Mincer's  model for the
case with  two  types of  labor  (low-wage and  high-wage
workers).  In their  model,  the minimum  wage is binding  only
for low-wage  workers in the covered sector.  Although  the
results are  more  complex, Mincer's conclusions  are  not
affected.  Essentially,  wages in the uncovered  sector  would
increase  with a  reduction  in the minimum wage as  long as
queuing  is not large.
"This result  was derived  taking into  account  that the
formal  sector  employed  72.4%  of the urban  labor  foree.
15with  similar  results  for  all  Latin  American  countries,  casts
doubt  on the adequacy  of the  Mincer  model  to explain  a non-
standard  result.  la
B. The  role  of demand  factors.
The previous is, however, a one sided approach.  By
looking  exclusively  at the supply  side  of the labor  -narket
(that  is the sectoral  reallocation  of labor),  the standard
approach  neglects  the possibility  of changes  in the demand
side acting in the  opposite direction. A  more  general
treatment  of the  problem  should  look  at labor  demand  as  well
as labor supply.  Employment  opportunities  in the informal
sector  are linked  in a direct  way to the overall  demand  for
the type of goods and services  the sector  produces.  Thus,
assuming  that  employment  opportunities  in  the  informal  sector
are  not  affected  by  the  changes  that  are  taking  place  in  the
formal  sector  is  acceptable  only  when  the informal  sector  is
autarkic  (meaning  that  it  does  not  "trade"  with the formal
sector).
The  formal  and  informal  sectors  are  linked  not  just
through  the  labor  market  but also  through  the goods  market
16Cole and  Sanders (1985] discuss the  validity of
Todaro's  model  using  similar  numerical  exercises.
16(Tokman (l9783).9'  Such relations can be represented as trade
flows.  Cole and Sanders [1985],  for example, built a model of
migration in which labor flows from one sector to the other
in response  to  trade  balance  disequilibriums.  The  scarce
evidence available  indicates that  the  informal sector  is
relatively "open to trade". 20 The question then becomes under
which conditions will a change in whe distribution of income
within  the  formal  sector.  induced by  a  reduction  in the
minimum wage. affect the inter-sectoral trade flows.
Unfortunately, very little is known about the nature of
those trade flows.  The available evidence  appears to indicate
that  the  informal  sector  exports  mainly  non-durable
consumption goods and services. Tokman  [1983], for example,
reports that in the case of Chile and Mexico, 70% of such
exports  are  consumption  goods  and  services,  the  rest  being
mainly  intermadiate  goods.  However,  given  the  characteristics
of  the  informal  sector,  it  is  safe  to  assume  such
intermediate goods are used in the  production  of  consumption
and  not  capital  goods.  Thus,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to
characterize informal sector exports as consumption goods.
19It  had  been  observed  that  the  informal  sector  both  buys
and  sells  consumption  and  inputs  from and  to  the  formal
sector. In addition,  formal  sector  firms  provide  credit to
the informal sector. Chaudhuri (1989]  offers a  recent example
of  a model  in which  the  formal  and  informal sectors  are
linked  through the labor, goods and credit markets.
20Tokman  (19833, for example, suggests that in Chile and
Mexico,  the  informal  sector  "exports"  approximately  half  of
its  output.
17The scarce  evidence  available  from  a few  Latin  American
countries  indicates  that low quality consumption  goods and
services  constitute  a large share of the informal sector
exports,  the principal  buyers  being  formal  sector  workers.  A
similar view can be found in the  1990 World Development
Report in  which the  informal sector is described as a
producer of  consumption  goods, espe.  e  ty by  low-income
households  (World  Bank  [1990]  p.63).  For  example,  Lopez  et  al
[1987]  found that, in Colombia, the demand for informal
sector  exports  is  closely  related  to the  wage-bill.  There  is
also some evidence from Latin  America indicating  that the
income-elasticity  of  the  demand  for  such  goods  is  much  higher
for  low-income than  for  high-income families  (Tokman
E1983)).21
Under  these  conditions,  a reduction  in  the  minimum  wage
could reduce the  demand for the  goods exported by the
informal  sector  and thus  reduce  employment  opportunities  in
the  sector.  Camargo  [1987],  for  example,  makes  this  argument
when  discussing  the  determination of  informal  sector
earnings.
The final impact  on the earnings  of informal  sector
workers  will depend  on both the changes in the demand for
their  exports  and the induced  changes  in  the  sector's  terms
21Adelman  and Taylor (1990] report, in the  case of
Mexico, higher values of household marginal expenditure
propensities  for  working  class  families  than  for  capitalists
in the  case  of industry,  services  and commerce.
18of trade.  Understanding this process requires  a more complete
model than the standard supply-side  one,  a  task undertaken in
the next section.
193.  -NO-DBEL
In the previous section I discussed the role played by
demand factors in determining the effects of a reduction in
the  minimum  wage  on  informal  sector  earnings.  In  this
section, a  model  of a  dual  economy  is built  in order  to
discuss  the role of demand factors in an analytical fashion.
The  standard  approach  looks  exclusively  at  the
allocational effects of changes in the minimum wage, and the
changes in informal sector  earnings associated with  them.
Many  economists  disagree  with  the  theory  of  employment
underlying the standard approach. In fact, the existence of
a negative  relationship between  wages and  employment, crucial
in the neoclassical approach, is not an undisputed truth.2
Here,  however,  I  will  not  dispute  the  exis-ence  of  a
negatively sloped labor demand function. The possibility of
a  reduction  in the minimum  wage  reducing  informal sector
earnings  will not be associated with an  un-conventional labor
demand function.
I will  concentrate my attention on a case in which  a
reduction  in  the  minimum  wage  generates  labor  mobility
towards the formal sector. By assuming full-employment, the
model will disregard the possibility of a reduction in the
2See Bourguignon (1988]  for a survey of the evidence on
this matter.
20minimum  wage  resulting  in  an  increase  in  informal  employment,
as suggested  by Mincer.
The  only  departure  from  the standard  approach  will  thus
be the existence  of market  interdependence  between  the two
sectors of the economy, embodied in the assumption  that
formal  sector  workers  buy  goods  produced  in  the  informal
sector.  Whenever  possible,  I  will  adopt  assumptions  which
conform  with standard  models.  The segmerLcation  in the labor
market  u-11 be seen  as the  result  of a non-competitive  wage
in the  formal sector.  The informal sector  will thus be
associated  with  the  "non-protected"  and  "competitive"  segment
of the economy.
The  model  will  not  necessarily  be an  accurate  picture  of
the complex  links  existing  between the formal  and informal
sectors  in  the real  world.  In spite  of its  relatively  simple
structure,  the  model  generates  a variety  of results.  It also
provides a reasonable  explanation  of what appears  to be a
paradox  for  standard  models:  a reduction  in  the  minimum  wage
may reduce  real informal  sector  wages.
*  *  *
Consider  an economy  in  which  the formal  sector  produces
a good X using  labor (Lf)  and capital (K),  and the informal
2This corresponds  to what Squire (1981]  calls modern
sector dualism in opposition  to the Lewis [1954]  type of
dualism,  which  he calls  traditional  sector  dualism.
21sector a good Q using labor (L,).  Good X  will be the
numeraire (P.-l).  Thus Q's price (P) can be seen as the
internal  terms  of trade.
A  labor  demand function  (2)  is derived  from  the
maximization  of profits,  subject  to the  production  function
(1)  and  a given  supply  of capital,  by formal  sector  firms.
X=X[Lf,  Kl  (1)
Lf  .Lf  [We,  Km  ,  a(2)
where  Wt  is  the  legislated  minimum  wage  which,  I  will  assume,
is the  prevailing  wage in the formal  sector. 24
The "wage"  in the informal  sector  (W,)  is assumed  to be
equal  to the value  of the average  product  of labor  in  that
sector (q). This treatment implie3 abstracting  from the
existence  of inequality  within  the informal  sector. Also,
this  assumption  reflects  the view  of the informal  sector  as
the  pool of urban surplus  labor,  organized  on family-based
production  units.
Wj-Pq  (3)
241n the  real  world,  the  minimum wage  applies  only  to  the
leos  skilled segment  of the formal  sector labor force.  Wf
could  thus  be seen  as the average  wage  in  the formal  sector,
which is a function  of the minimum  wage.  In that case,  the
results  derived  from  this  model  should  be multiplied  by the
elasticity  of Wf with respect  to the minimum wage, which
should  be positive  and  probably  smaller  than  one.
22This  treatment  of  the  informal  sector  is  chosen  in  order
to maintain  the parallel with the  standard  dual-economy
models.  If  the  variable  q is  seen  as  the  marginal  rather  than
the average product of  labor, equation (3) becomes the
standard  neoclassical  condition  of wages  being  equal  to the
value  of the  marginal  product,  and  nothing  essential  changes
in the  model.
The wage in the formal  sector  is fixed  above  the level
that would prevail without the minimum  wage. Equation (4)
reflects  the, existence  of  market  segmentation. Thus,
employment  in  the  informal  sector  is  determined  as  a  residual
according  to equation  (5).
Wf> WI  (4)
LI-L-Lf  [Wf,  (Z)
where  L is the fixed  supply  of labor.
The  average  product  of  labor  in  the  informal  sector  (q)
is  assumed  to diminish  with the size of the soctor's  labor
force.
q-¢D]  2[  ],(O  (6)
This  behavior  would  be  observed  when,  for  example,  the
production  of  Q partially  relies  on  the  use  of  certain  public
goods  (ie:  urban  infrastructure)  which  are  in  a  fixed  supply,
23and the increase  in informal  sector employment  reduces  the
access  to such  resources  by workers.5
Assume that capitalists  (owners  of the firms)  do not
consume  good  Q. This  assumption  is  meant  to  reflect  the  idea,
discussed previously,  that the  informal sector produces
consumption  goods  for  low-income  households.  Considering  the
more general case in which all  individuals  consume both
goods,  would  not  affect  the  model (although  it  would  make it
more  cumbersome)  if the  marginal  propensity  to consume  Q by
formal  workers  is  large  enough  relative to  that  of
capitalists.
Workers  in  both  sectors  are  assumed  to  maximizi,  their
utility  functions subject  to  their  respective budget
constraints.  Both X and Q will be considered  to be normal
goods 2'.
2If labor  were  not  homogeneous,  the  average  "ability"  of
the  working  force  could  change  as a  result  of changes  in its
size. If the  formal sector employs the  "best" workers,
average quality of  labor in the  informal sector should
increase as workers are shifted from the formal to the
informal sector. In that case we would have increasing,
rather  than diminishing,  labor  productivity  in the informal
sector.  Considering this  case  could  have  important
implications  for the results of the model,  which will be
discussed  later.
"This assumption  constitutes  the basis  of the demand-
side stories  presented  in section 2. If Q were an inferior
good, the direction of the  link between the formal and
informal  sectors  would  be reversed.
24The maximization  problem  can  be expressed  as:
max  U  [q  xj]
st  W 1=(Pq1)+x1 for  j=i  (7)
st  Wf=(Pq,)+X.  for  j=f
where  q 1 is  the  demand  of good  Q by  a  worker  in sector  J,  and
xi is the demand of good X by a worker in sector j. The
demands  for  both  goods  from  workers  in  both  sectors  are  then
derived  from  the  maximization  of  utilities.  Given  Walras  Law,
only  one of the two markets (the  market  for Q) needs  to be
considered  explicitly.
qr  =qfP,Wf]  ->  (o,  aqf>O  t8)
qtsql  [iP,  WI]  -q,P,  Pq[Ll]]  E|  gp  I  EW-  >0  (9)
Equation  (10)  represents  the  equilibrium  condition  in
the  market  for  Q.  It  is  derived  under  the  assumption  that
workers  have  identical  tastes.
L1q  tL  ]  -L 1, q[P,  Pq[L 1 ] ]LiL 1qf  [ P,  W  (10)
Stability  in the market  for  Q requires  that the excess
demand  falls  with its  price.
25Lfq,+  L  ,  jp  + L,  a  q  LI ]  (0  (X<1)
For  simplicity, the  price  elasticity (defined as
positive)  will be assumed  to be identical  for all workers.
Using the definitions  that follow and equations (20) and
(11),  the  stability  condition  can be expressed  as:
-eO  + ert  qi  0  (12)
where:
e'P.1e  1WP  = _  q 1'  enS  a d  ' 1  (13a,b,c) a  ;p  w, q,  aP q*  aw, qNX
The  stability  condition  (12)  is  similar  to the standard
negative  price  elasticity  condition  with  an additional  term
that  takes  into  account  the  expansion  in  demand  arising  from
the  income  effect  associated  with  the  change  in p. 27 Notice
that the income  elasticity  of demand is weighted  by  the
average  propensity  to consume  Q.
The real informal  wage (WR,)  will be defined as the
purchasing  power  of W 1 in  terms  of the  consumer's  price  index
27The  stability  condition  would  not  be  affected  if  a  more
general case were considered, in which different price-
elasticities  were  allowed  for  formal  and  informal  workers.  In
that case,  however, ep  should  be interpreted  as a  weighted
average  of the elasticities  of informal  and formal sector
workers,  the weights  being (q,/q)  and (1-q,/q)  respectively.
26WR  =  WI  (14)
7  =  PsPx 1-'  =  (15)
Using (14), (3) and (15),  the elasticity  of the real
informal wage  with  respect to  the  formal wage  (y) is
expressed as the  sum  of the  elasticities  of the  price
(weighted  by (1-a))  and labor  productivity  with respect  to
the formal  wage.
WR1 w  =  (l-a)  Wp  et  we  (16)
a=-5we  PIR  aWe  P  aW 
Before  deriving  the  expression  or  equation  (16),  define
q  as  the  elasticity  of labor  demand  in  the  formal  sector  (in
positive  terms),  a as the elasticity  of productivity  in the
informal  sector  with  respect  to employment,  and cYf as income
elasticity  of the demand  for  Q by formal  sector  workers.
aLf_ Wr;  0,  a  Li  err'  Wf;  (17a,b,c) -aw,Lf  Tr-"L 1 q'  "r  a-W 1q, 
Totally  differentiating  both sides  of (10),  and using
(3),  (10),  (5),  (13c)  and (17a,b,c),  it is  possible  to obtain
27the following expression for  the elasticity of the price with
respect to the minimum wage:
CIP  (  Wf(n-rL Lf  )Xge2  Lt  (18)
-aW,f P  eriqi-e,pq  L1
From (6), (5), (3)  and (17a,b),  the following expression
for the elasticity of labor productivity  with respect to the
minimum wage is obtained:
aWl g  L1  (19)
Finally, replacing  (18)  and (19) into (16), using  (10)
and  rearranging,  it  is  possible to  obtain  the  following
expression for the elasticity of the real informal wage with
respect to the minimum wage:
I  (q-g) (i-a)  (iL-eyfL 1)  (1-a)  aq(q-q 1 ert)  1  L  (20)
Le  (er't  q- ep  q)  (e qj  -e,g  )  L,
Notice that the stability condition (12) implies that
the denominators of the  first .wo terms on the right-hand
side of  (20) are negative. Thus their signs depend on the
numerators.
28The first  term  on the right-hand  side  of (20)  reflects
the effect  of a reduction  in the formal  sector  wage on the
real informal  wage  when  productivity  remains  unchanged.  For
reasons  that  will  soon  be apparent,  I  will  call  it the pure
terms  of trade  effect  (PTTE).
The reduction  in Wf directly affects the supply and
demand  for Q in a variety  of ways. The first  effect  is an
increase  in  formal  sector  employment  (the  magnitude  of which
depends on  1) and the corresponding  reduction  in informal
sector  employment.  Disregarding  changes  in  productivity,  this
effect  implies  a reduction  in the aggregate  supply  of Q. On
the demand  side,  total  demand  by formal  sector  workers  can
either  increase  or decrease.  On the one  hand,  this  group is
larger.  On the  other  hand,  their  wages  have  fallen.  The  final
result  will  depend  on  whether  the elasticity  of labor  demand
is  larger  or smaller  than  the income  elasticity  of the  demand
for  Q.
It is important  to notice  that  there  is a scale  factor
influencing  the final  impact  of a reduction  in the minimum
wage.  A reduction  of x% in Wf  will generate  an increase  of
a  x% in  formal  sector  employment.  When  the informal  sector
is large  (relative  to the formal  sector),  the corresponding
reduction  in informal  sector  employment  will  be less  than
q x%.  Thus,  at  constant  prices,  the  sector's  surplus
(defined  as total output minus the consumption  of Q  by
informal  sector  workers)  will also fall  by less  than  ix%.
29As the size of the informal  sector  falls (relative  to
the  formal  sector),  the  proportional  reduction  in  its  surplus
resulting from  an  x%  reduction  in  Wf  becomes  larger
(approximating  qx% as the employment  share  of the informal
sector reaches 50%), and  with  it  the  likelihood of  a
reduction  in  the  minimum  wage  having  a  positive  impact  on  the
terms  of trade.  When  the  relevant  parameters  are  such  that
the  demand  for  Q falls  by  more  than  its  supply,  a  reduction
in  P  (informal  sector's  terms  of  trade)  should  be  expected.
Proposition  1: When tl'i  productivity  of informal sector
workers  does not change  with the employment  level (a-0),  a
necessary  and sufficient  condition  for a reduction  in the
minimum  wage increasing  the real informal  wage through an
improvement  in its  terms  of  trade  vis-a-via  the  formal  sector
is:
if  ano -Y<O  - >eD  (21)
Equation  (21),  derived  from (20),  is  thus  the  necessary
and sufficient  condition  for  PT  being  negative,  so that  a
reduction  in  the  minimum  wagqe  improves  the  informal  sector's
terms  of trade.  This result  has the interest;:.ng  implication
that  a  reduction  in  the  minimu waae  is  most  liXely  to reduce
informal  sector  2arninas  the larger  the employment  share  of
the informal  seactor.
30The  second  term  on the right-hand  side of  (20), the
.roductivitv  effoct,  reflects  the  impact  (on  the  real
informal  wage) of the change in labor productivity resulting
from the inter-sectoral reallocation of labor  that follows a
reduction  in  the  minimum  wage.  Given  the  assumption  of
diminishing labor productivity (a<o),  the real informal  wage
increases as a result of a reduction in the minimum wage."
The third tarm on the right-hand side of (20)  represents
the change in terms of trade that results from the change in
labor productivity. Thus  I will  call it the nroductivity-
induced terms of tradg  effect. A  reduction in the minimum
wage increases informal labor  productivity and the  per capita
supply  of Q. Whether the per capita surplus increases depends
on the income elasticity  of the demand  for Q  by informal
sector workers. If this elasticity is sufficiently high the
terms of trade will improve as a result of the reduction in
the minimum wage.
Proposition 2: The necessary and sufficient condition for a
change in labor productivity (resulting from a reduction in
3  In the case in which average productivity of informal
sector workers falls as the most able workers move into the
formal  sector,  the  sign  of  the  productivity  effect  is
reversed.  However,  individual  informal  workers  will
experience a reduction in their wages only if there exists
some type of externality associated with the use of skills.
In other words,  if the  fruits of  labor were appropriated
individually  in  their  entirety,  we  shouldn't  expect  any
Rroductivity effects at the individual level.
31the minimum  wage)  improving the  informal sector  terms  of
trade  is:
erl>  (22)
An  important  implication of  (22) is that,  given  the
stability condition, it is  necessy  that the demand f  or Q be
price-elastic  for the productivity-induced terms  of trade
effect to be negative.
Equation  (20)  can  bui further  simplified  if  the
2roductivitv and Droductivity-induced terms of trade effect
are merged  into what  can  be  called  the  net  2roductivity
effect (NPEE, as in (23).
(q-qt)  (1-a)  OIL-erfLI)  +  q(l-ep)  -cc(q~-qert)  Iall  Li  (23)
- l  Lf (eyigi-epq)  (erjj-e'pq)  I LI
As the productivity effect  is unambiguously negative,
condition  (22)  - is sufficient  for the  NPE being  negative.
However, less stringent conditions can be derived.
Proposition  3: It is sufficient that  the demana  for Q  be
elastic for the NEE to be negative  (so that a reduction in
the minimum  wage  has a  positive  effect  on  real  informal
32wages)  .29  When this condition  is not met, a lower bound on
a  (Q's weight in  i)  is necessary and sufficient for a
negative  NPE:
if  o<0,  NPE<O  - el,1
if  o<o  and  e  <l,  NPE<O  >  p  (24)
31-  gf  eyl q
The  interpretation  of  proposition  3  is  straightforward.
Given o<O, the per capita supply for Q increases  as the
minimum wage is reduced. If Q's demand  were elastic,  per
capita revenue (and the  real wage) would unambiguously
increase.  However,  even if the demand  for Q were inelastic
and  per  capita  revenue  falls  as a result  of  the reduction  in
the minimum wage, the real consumption  wage would still
increase  due to the  reduction  in the price,  if Q's share  in
the consumption  basket  were sufficiently  large. 30
The  final effect on  the  real  informal wage  of  a
reduction  in the minimum  wage will depend  on both the PTTE
and the NPE. Table 2 synthesizes  the different possible
29It must be remembered  that the stalility  condition
implies  that Cp2l  is less  stringent  than  condition  (22).
3When there is increasing  productivity  (o>O),  it is
necessary  that  the demand  for  Q be inelastic  for  the ME  to
be negative.  This necessary  condition  being satisfied,  an
upper  bound  on a  is necessary  and sufficient  for the NPE to
be negative.  As a>o,  the  per capita  supply  of  Q falls  as the
minimum wage is reduced,  and thus an inelastic  demand is
required  for  per  capita  revenue  to  increase.  The  upper  bound
on  a guarantees  that  the  improvement  in  terms  of  trade  will
not result in a reduction  in the real consumption  wage of
informal  workers.
33outcomes.  The  conditions  for  each  entry  have  been  determined
above.
Table  3:
NPE >  O  NPE <O  NPE  i O
PTTE >  0  y >  0  ?  y >  0
PTTE <  o  ?  y  <  o  y <  0
PTTE  - 0.  y > 0  y  <  0  y  - 0
As table  3  suggests,  when  the  PTTE  and  NPE  have  opposite
signs,  a  qualitative  answer  cannot  be given:  the impact  of a
reduction  in the minimum  wage  will depend  on how strong  the
two effects  are.
The principal  message of the model is that including
demand links between the two sectors generates  much more
complex results than those suggested  by standard models
focusing  exclusively  on labor  supply  links  between  sectors.
The model  identifies  the conditions  for  the standard  result
to hold,  with  the implication  that  the  gossibilitv  of a non-
standard  result  cannot  be ruled  out, even  if the allocation
effects  of a  reduction in the minimum waie  are  in the
direction  of reducina  informal  eMDlovment.
Available evidence indicates that  the  non-standard
result  is  not just  a curiosity,  but a real  possibility  among
many  countries in  Latin  America. According to  recent
estimates  by  the  International  Labour  Organization  almost  one
34third of the urban population in the area is employed in the
informal sector.  31 Accurate estimates of the wage-employment
elasticity in the formal sector of the economy are not easy
to  obtain.  The  most  recent  evidence  appears  to  indicate
values in the range between 0.2 and 0.5 (Bourguignon [1988]
and Solimano (1987]).32
Based on these parameters,  the PTTE would be positive (a
reduction in the minimum wage worsens the informal sector's
terms of trade) for values of the income- elasticity of the
demand  for the informal sector  good (eyf)  ranging  between 0.65
and 1.63. Lustig  [1979] has used Mexican data  to estimate
income-elasticities  for  traditional  manufacturing  goods
(clothing,  furniture,  etc.)  and  services  by  low  income
families that  range  between  1.06 and  2.19.  Tokman  (1978]
suggests that the income-elasticity for goods produced in  the
informal sector in Chile and Mexico is close to 2.0. Lluch et
al (1977], have estimated income-elasticities of demand by
low income households in a number of Latin American cities.
The elasticities corresponding to clothing (the other items
31According  to  PREALC  (1987]  30.7%  of  the  urban
population,  in a sample  of nine Latin American  countries,
worked in the informal sector in 1985.
32Solimano  (1987]  estimates  the  wage-employment
elasticities for the  manufacturing sector in  Brazil and Chile
under  three  macroeconomic  regimes:  Keynesian,  Forniz;n
Exchange  Constraint,  and  Classical.  The  estimates
corresponding to the first  two regimes are either positive or
close to  zero.  Under  the classical  regime  the  elasticity
takes values within the above mentioned range.
35being food,  housing, and durable  goods)  range  between 1.16
and 1.83.
The  available empirical evidence, thus, appears to
indicate  that the PTTE might actually  be positive  in many
Latin  American  countries.  This  result  is  more  likely  to take
place  in  those  countries  in  which  the  employment  share  of the
informal  sector  is above  30%.
It is somewhat harder to empirically  establish the
direction  of the NPE. The evidence  amassed  by Llach et al
(1977]  indicates  that  the  demand  by low income  households  is
price  ine'astic.  In  the  case  of  the  demand  for  clothing,  most
of the  estimates  range  between  -0.2  and  -0.4.  Such  low  values
imply  that  a  negative  NPE  would  require  that  informal  workers
spend  an extremely  large  percentage  of  their  income  on goods
produced  in the informal  sector.
Testing  the likelihood  of a non-standard  result  on the
exclusive  basis  of  the labo.  mobility  effect  (as  suggested  by
Mincer)  could  be misleading  if  the parameters  are such  that
either  the  PTTE  or the  NPE  are  positive.  A  more  complete  test
of  the  model  requires  better  information  on  the  nature  of  the
goods produced in the  informal sector, as well as  the
consumption  patterns of low-income  families both in the
formal  and  informal  sectors. The  simple  calculations
discussed  above suggests  that  such  an  enterprise  could be
extremely  productive.
364. CON.QU8IOQi
The model developed in this essay suggests that the
answer  to the title question "Do workers in the informal
sector  benefit  from  reductions  in  the minimum  wage?"  is "it
depends".  If  workers  in  the  formal  sector  are  the  main  buyers
of the goods produced in the informal  sector, and their
income  elasticity  of demand  is relatively  large,  the answer
could  me  negative.  Also,  a  non-standard  result  is  more  likely
if the informal  sector  employs  a large  share  of the urban
labor  force,  anc the demand  for the goods  produced in the
informal sector is price-inelastic.  More generally, the
presence  of demand links  between  the two bectors  does not
allow  one to make strong  a priori  predictions.3
What  distinguishes  this  model  from  Mincer's  treatment  of
the same problem is that the direction  of the effect of
changes  in the  minimum  wage  on informal  sector  earnings  does
not  depend  exclusively  on that  of the labor  mobility  effect.
The  possibility  of a  non-standard  result  cannot  be  ruled  out,
even  if  the allocation  effects  of a  reduction  in  the  minimum
wage are in the direction  of reducing  informal  employment.
This  aspect  of the  model  is  important  for  two  reasons.  First,
it  provides  a  more  general  explanation,  including  a  wider  set
3Bourguignon [1990]  reached  a similar  conclusion  when
analyzing the  role  of  demand  factors influencing the
relationship  between  growth  and inequality.
37of conditions  under  which a non-standard  result  can occur.
Second,  the result  is  not  dependent  on the  existence  of high
levels  or large  c.ianges  in open  unemployment.
The model  highlights  two sources  of change  in informal
sector earnings: changes in the  inter-sectoral  terms of
trade, and  changes in  informal-labor  productivity.  With
respect  to the second  source,  the existence  of diminishing
labor  productivity  has beern  assumed.  When the existence  of
heterogenous labor is considered,  a case with increasing
labor productivity may  arise, which makes it even more
difficult  to  make  a  priori  predictions  about  whether  informal
sector  workers  benefit  from  reductions  in the minimum  wage.
In section  1 of this  essay  two  views  of minimum  wages  -
those  derived  from  the  standard  approach  and  those  suggesting
that  earnings  of informal  workers  are  positively  affected  by
minimum  wages  - were contrasted.  Using  a model in  which  the
two sectors are linked both through the labor and goods
markets,  this  paper  shows  that  those  views  can  be treated  as
two potential  outcomes  arising  from  a  more  general  case.
The empirical  evidence,  which apparently  indicates  a
higher likelihood  of a non-standard  result, seems to be
supportive  of the case against  reductions  in the minimum
wage. In that sense,  the main policy implication  of this
paper is that governments,  and multilateral  organizations,
should be cautious when following  the advice of standard
38theories,  which suggest  that  reductions  in  the minimum  wage
will  benefit  workers  in the informal  sector.
It should be  noticed, however, that a  non-standard
result  does not affect the case against  minimum wages on
efficiency  grounds.  In  the  context of  the  model  here
discussed, a  reduction  in  the  minimum wage  increases
employment  and output in the formal  sector  of the economy.
Such  conclusien  could  be changed  in a more  general  approach
which includes wage-productivity  links, as  suggested by
efficiency  wage theories.
The model _resented in this essay is symmetric in
nature.  Thus,  as long as the conditions  for a non-standard
result  are  satisfied,  it  follows  that  workers  in  the  informal
sector  should  benefit from policies  that increase  minimum
wages.  The experience  of several  Latin  American  countries,
however,  indicates  that  aggressive  minimum  wage  policies  have
not been  particularly  successful  in improving  standards  of
living  in  the informal  sector.  Such  an  asymmetry  could  result
from the existence  of nominal  rigidities  which the model
presented  in  this  essay,  built  in  real  terms,  is not able  to
capture.
39APPENDIX
In Mincer's model workers search for jobs in the formal
sector until the net expected discounted gain of such search
equals zero.
W  f  Pt_W  =  0
o  (l+r)  t
where Wf and Wi  are the wages in  the formal  and informal sector
respectively,  r  is  the  discount  rate,  and  Pt is  the
probability of being employed in period t, which equals:
Pc = Ep[(1-p)  (i-8)  I
0
where 6 is the rate of labor turnover in the formal sector.
The probability of finding a formal sector job during a
particular period (p) is defined as:
8+
where u  is the unemployment rate. When the time period  is
sufficiently  small, the equilibrium  unemployment rate equals:
U= (r+8)  WI  =)
40Then, the following expression can be derived:
dW1 a-l  dWf
Wi  8+ L1 e  Wf
Lf
where  q  and e are the elasticities of labor demand in the
formal  and informal sector, and L,  and Lf  employment in  the two
sectors. The elimination in the minimum wage will reduce the
informal sector wage only when  <a.
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